14 October 2014
The graph of Corrected Money Supply (M1 non-seasonally adjusted plus Sweeps minus Personal Savings) below shows that monetary growth has levelled off after rising for nearly five straight years. The figures are from January 2001 to August 2014; the lag of two months is because of the lag in savings data.
This graph uses the savings figures revised by the BEA in July 2013. It also assumes that sweeps have remained constant since May 2012 when the Fed discontinued publication of sweeps data.
On October 29 the Fed is expected to announce that it will end its bond-buying programme or QE.
The last monetary contraction which started around January 2006 first had its effect on housing starts, then on housing prices, then on bank fortunes, eventually leading to a crisis in the payments system, and finally decimating all asset markets.
13 May 2014
It has happened often in physics that a single phenomenon is explained, or a single puzzle resolved, by two theories that seem at first sight to be completely divergent but are later shown to be equivalent. Examples that spring to mind are Heisenberg's matrix mechanics and Schrodinger's wave mechanics or the quantum electrodynamic theories of Tomonaga, Schwinger and Feynman. In macroeconomics, the second half of the 20th century was dominated by the dispute between Keynesianism and monetarism, especially their divergent explanations of recessions, a dispute that continues to this day. This paper demonstrates that the conflict hinges on a simple dimensional misinterpretation of one of the variables in the quantity theory of money. At their heart, the two theories are equivalent.
Read the entire paper: The mathematical equivalence of Keynesianism and monetarism
09 May 2014
Primitive tribes must be the most equal of societies. Few of us, though, aspire to that kind of equality.
The thought occurred on reading about (note, not reading) Thomas Piketty's Capital in the 21st century that seems set to be the best-selling economics text of recent times. Piketty, who has in some quarters been hailed as a latter-day Marx, notes that income inequality in the US remained stable from 1910 to 1920, rose from 1920 to 1929, fell steeply after the Great Crash of October 1929 until the end of the war, remained stable until around 1980, and then rose steadily again, until in 2007 it rose above the level of 1928. A graph can be seen on Piketty's web site. To set right what he sees as a dire situation, possibly to prevent a capture of western governments by its poverty-stricken masses, Piketty suggests a general wealth tax and a top income tax rate of 80%.
Piketty seems to think that greater equality is something much to be desired. To test this I searched on the net for inequality measures for the Soviet Union to compare with the US. And I found some interesting figures in a paper Income Distribution in the USSR in the 1980s by Michael V. Alexeev and Clifford G. Gaddy. For the US some comparable figures can be found on the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis web site.
The table below compares the two:
Readers may recall that the only revolution that happened was in the USSR, not in the US.
Poring over English factory inspector reports in the sixties and seventies of the 19th century Marx reached the conclusion that the overthrow of capitalism was imminent. If nothing else, Marx's prognostications should serve as a warning that one must not use short-term data to jump to eternal conclusions. In the graph the current trend of rising inequality dates from around 1980. Is there any other variable that could explain this as well as the shifts in inequality mentioned earlier: stable from 1910 to 1920, a rise from 1920 to 1929, a fall thereafter until 1945, stable until 1980, and a rise thereafter?
It is illuminating to look at the following graph of US long term interest rates.
It is taken from The real rate of interest from 1800-1990: A study of the US and UK by Jeremy J. Siegel. The graph of inequality on Piketty's site and the interest rate graph here follow a similar trajectory. The period from 1910 to 1920 is a period of rising rates and stable inequality. Thereafter the interest rate falls and inequality grows. Similarly the period from 1980 is a period of rising inequality, and interest rates begin to fall from around that date. The Depression years were an exception. So were the war years but then that was a period of wage and price controls.
One cannot help but feel that low interest rates help push up asset prices and thus boost those who earn a substantial part of their income from financial assets. Now it so happens that the people who complain about rising inequality, Paul Krugman to take one example, are also the ones clamouring loudest for keeping interest rates low. Talk about the law of unintended consequences.
02 May 2014
A mathematical equation that correctly describes a physical relationship between quantities is dimensionally homogeneous. However, the converse is not true. An equation that is dimensionally homogeneous does not imply the existence of a physical relationship between the quantities in that equation. The dimensions of the velocity of money are generally taken to be t-1. In what follows we examine this assumption and show that it is physically impossible. We then show what the correct dimensions of velocity are and arrive at the surprising inference that at their core Keynesianism and monetarism amount to the same thing.
02 April 2014
The velocity of money has a way of frustrating the best-laid plans of central banks. For instance, when the Fed wants to squeeze the growth of money it often finds that velocity increases sharply, so that the same amount of money does much more work than before, thus rendering the constriction of money ineffective. Similarly, when the Fed wants to expand the amount of money, it often finds that the velocity of money falls sharply.
The unpredictability of money velocity was a key factor in hastening the demise of monetarism in the eighties. Economics, the textbook by Paul Samuelson and William Nordhaus, said in the 2005 edition: "As the velocity of money became increasingly unstable, the Federal Reserve gradually stopped using it as a guide for monetary policy... Indeed, in 1999, the minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee contain not a single mention of the term 'velocity' to describe the state of the economy or to explain the reasons for the committee's short-run policy actions."
Economists since Milton Friedman have sought to relate velocity to a number of factors and have been unsuccessful. The graph below will therefore come as an utter surprise to many. It plots the velocity of money against Moody's Seasoned AAA Corporate Bond Yield. For the entire period of five decades, 1960 to 2011 it shows that velocity runs a course exactly parallel to corporate bond yield. No one can be more surprised than I am. The velocity of money graph occurs in my book "The General Theory of Money" published in May 2012 but until now I had never thought of connecting it with interest rates if only because all the papers I had read never spoke of any relation between the two.
The monetary aggregate used in the graph is what I have called Corrected Money Supply in my book. A brief explanation is in order. Assume that you receive a salary of $1000 at the start of every month into your demand deposit. During the course of the month you spend 95% of this and save 5%. So the demand deposit would start at $1000 and run down to $50. However, you choose to keep a little extra in your demand deposit to allow for exigencies, say $500, roughly the value of your demand deposit at the middle of the month. If you add all the funds in all demand deposits in the economy there would thus be a certain amount of money that is never spent. Corrected Money Supply is M1 reduced by this money that is not a medium of exchange but is held purely with a precautionary motive.
One economist who came close to identifying the relation between money velocity and interest rates was John Tatom. In a 1983 paper called "Was the 1982 velocity decline unusual?" published by the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis he observed that during numerous recessions after 1947 the velocity of money fell. He was, however, puzzled by the fact that in the 1970 and 1973-75 recessions the velocity rose. After some analysis he concluded: "Explanations that focus on declining interest rates also do not match up well with the recent pattern of velocity declines. In the first quarter of 1982, corporate Aaa bond yields averaged 15.01 percent and had risen from 14,62 percent one quarter earlier or 14.92 percent two quarters earlier. During the remaining quarters of 1982, the bond yield declined to 14.51 percent, 13.75 percent and 11.88 percent.9 The pattern in the second half of 1982 is consistent with a decline in velocity. What remains unexplained, however, is the largest decline in velocity, which occurred in the first quarter."
If Tatom had had the right monetary aggregate he would have reached different conclusions. He would also have realised that if money velocity falls during most recessions it is because usually interest rates fall during recessions.
The mechanism relating a rise in interest rate to a rise in velocity (or as it has been sometimes called, the case of the missing money), is quite simple. But for economists who have been brought up to view money in a particular way it is very difficult to grasp.